Weekly analysis for 19 — 25 May

Government Proposes Restoring Prosecutor’s General Supervisory Powers

Event

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine has submitted draft law № 15253 to Parliament. The draft amends the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” to align the prosecutor’s functions regarding the representation of state interests in court with the Constitution of Ukraine.

The Government prepared the draft law to implement Decision № 6-r(II)/2025 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine of December 3, 2025 in the case concerning prosecutors’ representation of state interests in court, as discussed in our earlier analysis.

In this Decision, the Court declared unconstitutional certain prosecutorial powers that allowed prosecutors to represent state interests in court where the competent state authority, local self-government body or other public authority either failed to protect those interests or did so improperly. The Court found that prosecutors may constitutionally represent state interests in civil, commercial and administrative proceedings only where, in the relevant area of legal relations, there is no public authority empowered to protect those interests.

CPLR’s assessment 

One clearly positive element of the draft law is its proposal to remove the prosecution service’s authority to represent citizens’ interests in court, in full compliance with Article 131-1 of the Constitution of Ukraine. This role is already performed by the legal profession and the free legal aid system. At the same time, Constitutional Court Decision № 6-r(II)/2025 did not concern the representation of citizens’ interests in court.

However, despite the constitutional requirement that the prosecution service may represent state interests in court only in “exceptional cases” under Article 131-1(3), and despite the above-mentioned Constitutional Court decision, draft law № 15253 effectively restores the prosecution service’s general supervision function.

The indirect restoration of general supervision is achieved through a combination of two sets of amendments to Article 23 of the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office: (a) the introduction of excessively broad or evaluative grounds for representing state interests, which again fail to meet the principle of legal certainty; and (b) the expansion of prosecutorial powers to carry out such representation.

The following grounds for representing state interests are particularly concerning:

• violation or threat of violation of Ukraine’s fundamental national interests or strategic nationwide priorities; 
• violation of state interests by a public authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law; 
• existence of a conflict of powers between public authorities, local self-government bodies and other legal entities under public law; 
• request by a public authority, local self-government body or other legal entity under public law for the prosecutor to file a claim
  (points 1, 4, 5 and 8 of part 2 of Article 23 of the Law, in the wording proposed by the draft law).

The draft law also restores prosecutors’ authority to bring claims in disputes involving state-owned companies (part 2 of Article 23 of the Law, in the wording proposed by the draft law).

In this respect, it is difficult to justify treating claims filed by prosecutors at the request of local self-government bodies, legal entities under public law or state-owned companies as falling within the constitutional function of representing state interests in court.

The powers granted to prosecutors under points 1, 2, 4 and 5 of part 4 of Article 23 of the Law, in the wording proposed by the draft law — namely, to submit written requests for information, collect factual information, certify copies of documents and obtain opinions from specialists and experts — are generally proportionate insofar as they correspond to the powers of a party in civil or commercial proceedings.

The proportionality of allowing prosecutors to send requests to civic associations, while requiring those associations to provide information to prosecutors, is also questionable. By contrast, the power provided for in point 3 of part 4 of Article 23 of the Law, in the wording proposed by the draft law — namely, the power to obtain written explanations from officials and civil servants of state authorities, local self-government bodies or other legal entities under public law, and from other persons with their consent — is inconsistent with the constitutional principles of adversarial civil and commercial proceedings and equality of the parties (Article 129(2) of the Constitution of Ukraine). This provision effectively revives the general supervision model of the prosecution service. It creates a risk of abuse and could be used either to serve the interests of certain political or business groups or to exert pressure on them. Instead, as a party to the proceedings, the prosecutor should be limited to requesting that the court summon the relevant officials as witnesses. 

The draft law also fails to introduce amendments to the procedural codes (the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, the Commercial Procedure Code of Ukraine, and the Code of Administrative Procedure of Ukraine), although these codes contain provisions governing the protection of state interests in court. In particular, the rules on covering court costs for opinions provided by experts and specialists at the prosecutor’s request require clarification.

Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030: Unexplained Removal of Key Provisions

Event

On May 13, draft Law “On the Principles of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2026–2030” (Reg. № 15230), submitted by a Member of Parliament of Ukraine, was registered in the Verkhovna Rada. On May 18, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine submitted an alternative draft law with the same title (Reg. № 15230-1). Both drafts contain the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030.

The adoption of the Strategy is intended to implement measure No. 2 under strategic result No. 1 of subsection 2.1 of Section II “Fight against Corruption”, of the Rule of Law Roadmap, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Order № 475-р. of May 14, 2025. This measure concerns the further development and systematisation of Ukraine’s anti-corruption policy as part of Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. Under the Ukraine Facility Plan, the strategy and anti-corruption programme must be adopted by the end of June 2026.

CPLR’s position

The National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) developed the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030 together with Ukrainian experts from numerous civil society organisations, including CPLR. As part of this process, NACP held 26 public consultations involving 790 experts, and the drafting process lasted approximately two years.

On April 2 the NACP submitted the draft to the Government and published it on its website.

However, the Government did not submit the relevant draft law to the Verkhovna Rada for almost two months. As a result, Anastasiia Radina, Chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Anti-Corruption Policy, registered NACP’s original version of the draft without changes.

At the same time, the Government removed from the draft Anti-Corruption Strategy a number of provisions important for Ukraine’s European integration process.

Among the removed provisions were strategic results concerning:

• granting the Deputy Prosecutor General — Head of Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) — the authority to enter information into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations regarding possible criminal offences committed by Members of Parliament; approve motions considered by an investigating judge; and carry out other necessary investigative and procedural actions in all criminal proceedings under NABU’s jurisdiction, without involving the Prosecutor General (problem 1.10.3);
• introducing competitive selection for the position of Prosecutor General, clearly defining the grounds for a vote of no confidence in the Prosecutor General, and establishing the grounds for submitting a motion to the disciplinary body or the High Council of Justice to dismiss the Prosecutor General from an administrative position (problem 2.2.2);
• introducing a transparent, merit-based and predictable procedure for selecting the Head of the National Police of Ukraine, with the involvement of independent experts delegated by international partners, and improving the selection procedure for the Director of the State Bureau of Investigation, taking into account the European Commission’s recommendations (problem 2.2.7);
• enshrining in the Constitution the status of the National Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission as an independent state collegial body (problem 2.7.1).

In addition, the Government amended or removed certain provisions concerning urban development (problem 2.5.9), taxation (problem 2.10), the improving mechanisms for selling seized assets in enforcement proceedings (problem 2.9.11), and other issues.

The Government has not provided any explanation for these changes.

The EU may interpret this as a rollback of reforms, particularly reform of the prosecution service, and as evidence that the prosecution service has not been sufficiently depoliticised.

There may be several reasons why these provisions were excluded:

1. unwillingness to formalise politically binding reform commitments. Once a provision is included in the Anti-Corruption Strategy, international partners may treat it as a commitment, creating clear expectations regarding its implementation. Removing such provisions increases the Government’s discretion and allows it to avoid strict benchmark obligations.
2. an attempt to avoid conflict between branches of power. Issues such as competitive selection for the positions of Prosecutor General, Head of the National Police and Director of the State Bureau of Investigation are politically sensitive. Quietly removing these provisions may have simplified approval of the document, but it also reduces transparency and undermines public trust.

The timely adoption of the AntiCorruption Strategy is critically important for fulfilling Ukraine’s international commitments, particularly within the framework of the Ukraine Facility, as well as for implementing the Rule of Law Roadmap. NACP hopes that both draft laws will be discussed in a constructive and professional manner, ultimately leading to the most ambitious possible version of the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2026–2030.