Weekly analysis for 23 — 29 June

Martial law does not cancel respect for human rights — not even temporarily.

Event

On 24 June 2026, the Second Senate of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) delivered Decision № 4-r(II)/2026 in a case concerning the constitutional complaint of Serhii Oleksiiovych Hnezdilov on the constitutionality of Part 8 of Article 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine. 

In his complaint, Hnezdilov challenged, in particular, Part 8 of Article 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Under this provision, as amended on 1 December 2022, military personnel suspected or accused of offences under Articles 402–405, 407, 408, and 429 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine could, during martial law, only be subjected to one preventive measure specified in Paragraph 5, Part 1 of this article: namely, pre-trial detention. 

The Constitutional Court found Part 8 of Article 176 to be inconsistent with the Constitution of Ukraine. The provision will remain in force for three months from the date of the judgment, after which it will cease to have legal effect. 

CPLR’s position

On 19 June 2024, in Decision № 7-r(II)/2024 concerning the constitutional complaints of Serhii Andriiovych Bychkov and Anatolii Anatoliiovych Bai, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) upheld the constitutionality of Part 6 of Article 176 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine (CPC). Under this provision, during martial law, individuals suspected or accused of offences under Articles 109–114-2, 258–258-6, 260, 261, and 437–442 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine may be placed in pre-trial detention where the risks identified in Article 177 of the CPC are established. 

In justifying the proportionality of this restriction, the CCU relied on the protection of Ukraine’s national interests and statehood as legitimate constitutional objectives. The Court further stressed the need for a special regime governing the application of pre-trial detention to individuals suspected or accused of offences that, by their nature and gravity, pose an exceptional threat under conditions of martial law.

At that time, in assessing the constitutionality of Part 6 of Article 176 of the CPC against the requirement of proportionality, the CCU held that the provision is constitutional insofar as it provides for an exclusive preventive measure — detention in custody — for individuals suspected or accused of committing a specified list of offences. The Court based its conclusion on five considerations, namely that the restriction introduced by the legislature:

1) is temporary in nature, as it may be applied solely during the period of martial law;

2) is proportionate, as it pursues a legitimate aim, namely the strengthening of the protection of Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability, defence capability, and state, economic, and information security, and corresponds to the statutory objectives of criminal proceedings;

3) is exceptional in scope, as it applies only to individuals suspected or accused of offences which, by their nature and gravity, are considered extremely dangerous under conditions of martial law. Their heightened threat derives from the value of the protected interests at stake: not merely national security, but its foundational elements; not merely public safety, but protection against terrorism; and not merely the international legal order, but peace, the security of humankind, and those elements of the international legal order undermined by the most serious international crimes

4) may be applied only where the risks set out in Article 177 of the Code are established;

5) may be applied to any individual suspected or accused of committing the specified offences.

At the same time, in its Judgment in the case concerning the constitutional complaints of Maryna Anatoliivna Kovtun, Nadiia Viktorivna Savchenko, Ihor Dmytrovych Kostohlodov, and Valerii Ivanovych Chornobuk on the constitutionality of Part 5 of Article 176 of the CPC, dated 25 June 2019 (№. 7-r/2019), the CCU found Part 5 of Article 176 of the CPC to be unconstitutional. 

The provision, later repealed by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, had stipulated that preventive measures in the form of personal obligation, personal surety, house arrest, and bail could not be applied to individuals suspected or accused of offences under Articles 109–114-1, 258–258-5, 260, and 261 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

The ССU agreed with the complainants that this approach was discriminatory, as it placed individuals subject to preventive measures in an unequal position compared to those suspected or accused of offences of a comparable level of gravity.

The CCU agreed. Part 5 of Article 176 of the CPC was later removed based on Law № 2531-IX of 16 August 2022.

However, the same approach was effectively reintroduced through the adoption of Law № 2198-IX of 14 April 2022, which amended Article 176 of the CPC by adding a new Part 6 of substantially similar content. Under this provision (in the version as of 17 June 2025), during martial law, individuals suspected or accused of offences under Articles 109–114-2, 258–258-6, 260, 261, and 437–442-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine may, where the risks set out in Article 177 of the CPC are available, be subject to the preventive measure of detention in custody.

Contrary to the restriction provided for in Part 6 of Article 176 of the CPC, the restriction established by Part 8 of Article 176 of the CPC, although formally temporary, is:

1) disproportionate, since, as held by the CCU e in its judgment № . 7-r/2019 of 25 June 2019, “the contested provision justifies detention solely on the basis of the gravity of the offence, which does not ensure a fair balance between the purpose of its application in criminal proceedings and the individual’s right to liberty and personal security”;

2) discriminatory, as it places individuals subject to this preventive measure in an unequal position compared both with: a) those suspected or accused of offences of a comparable degree of seriousness and b) those suspected or accused of even more serious offences;

3) may be applied without any assessment of the risks set out in Article 177 of the Code;

4) limited to specific categories of persons, since the offences under Articles 402–405, 407, 408, and 429 of the Criminal Code can be committed exclusively by military personnel;

5) permits detention on remand to be imposed on the basis of a purely formal judicial determination, thereby undermining the principle of the rule of law.

At the same time, the CCU’s systematic practice of postponing the legal effects of its findings of unconstitutionality raises concerns, particularly where such provisions do not concern positive rights of citizens. Fundamental human rights such as the right to life, human dignity, liberty, and personal integrity do not depend on the state. Accordingly, the state cannot impose arbitrary time limits on the restoration of fundamental rights that have been violated by legislation.

For this reason, decisions of the CCU in such cases should enter into force on the date of their adoption.

ОЕСD Assessed the Integrity of Ukraine’s Judiciary

Event

On 22 June, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) presented the findings of its assessment of Ukraine under the study “Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook 2026” The study covers 6 areas and assesses both the adequacy of the legal framework and its practical implementation against the standards set out in the Public Integrity Indicators.

Under the “Judicial Integrity” indicator, Ukraine’s legal framework was assessed as 97% aligned with applicable standards, while implementation in practice reached 92%. Both results are significantly above the OECD average among member states (66% and 45%, respectively). The indicator includes the following criteria:

• the legal and regulatory framework governing judicial integrity, including the presence (and in some cases quality) of rules regulating personnel procedures within the court system (selection, promotion, transfer, disciplinary liability, and dismissal), financing of the judiciary, case allocation, ethical standards, conflicts of interest, asset declarations, and related safeguards;
• anti-corruption and integrity safeguards in practice, including transparency of information on judicial vacancies; ethical standards; appointment of judges by an independent body; the presence of an advisory ethics body within the judiciary; judiciary funding aligned with approved budgetary plans; rates of submission and verification of asset declarations; regulation of conflicts of interest; availability of specialised training for judges on integrity and anti-corruption measures; and the use of electronic systems for managing and tracking complaints, corruption-related cases, etc.;
• public accessibility of information, including data on court caseloads, as well as publication of administrative and criminal court decisions and asset declarations;
• practical protection of whistleblowers within the justice system, including the availability of whistleblower rights portal and reporting mechanisms, internal reporting channels across all levels of courts, and mandatory training for staff handling whistleblower reports on confidentiality and related safeguards;
• Level of asset declaration compliance among judges;
• judicial vacancies;
• proportion of “temporary” judges.

Among the shortcomings that negatively affected the OECD’s assessment were the absence of clear criteria for selecting candidates for the positions of court presidents, the lack of mandatory training for court staff responsible for handling corruption whistleblower reports, and insufficient funding of the judiciary.

CPLR’s expert assessment 

The OECD assessment results reflect substantial progress achieved by Ukraine over the past decade in strengthening its system of judicial integrity. However, given the methodology and scope of the assessment, these findings should not be interpreted as evidence that sufficient measures have already been taken in this area, or that further steps to strengthen judicial independence, accountability, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption safeguards within the justice system are no longer necessary. For instance, the study does not assess the effectiveness of mechanisms for the timely detection of judicial misconduct, the efficiency of the disciplinary responsibility framework, the quality of asset declaration verification procedures, or the compliance with and enforcement of judicial integrity standards.

Furthermore, in its 2025 report on the state of implementation of recommendations under the V Round of Monitoring (the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan), the OECD emphasised the need to establish and implement clear criteria and methodologies for assessing the integrity and professional ethics of judicial candidates and judges; to accelerate the completion of judicial qualification assessments and the filling of vacant judicial positions, while ensuring due process, integrity standards, and objectivity in assessment; to ensure the participation of judicial authorities in parliamentary discussions on the judiciary’s budget; to clarify the grounds on which the High Council of Justice may refuse to submit proposals for judicial appointments; to ensure proper reasoning of the Council’s decisions; and to further specify the grounds for disciplinary responsibility of judges.