Weekly analytics for 27 May – 02 June

“Raising” the Liability for Corruption

Event

In May, three draft laws aimed at amending the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses, and other related legislation were registered in Verkhovna Rada. The titles of these draft laws make ambitious claims about raising the liability for corruption and corruption-related offenses, or improving mechanisms for holding individuals accountable.

The first draft law (№ 13271) was submitted by MP S.Vlasenko on May 9, 2025.

The second draft (№ 13271-1 of May 23, 2025) was initiated by a broad coalition of MPs, including O. Tkachenko, O. Kopylenko, K. Nesterenko, D. Chornyi, V. Borodin, I. Kryvosheiev, K. Kasai, A. Motovylovets, M. Buzhanskyi and others.

The third draft (№ 13271-2) was registered by MP V. Nekliudov on May 26, 2025.

CPLR’s assessment

There is no significant difference between the three draft laws. They propose the following:

• to increase the minimum threshold for declarant’s submission knowingly false information in a declaration by a declarant (Part 1 of Article 366-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – hereinafter the CC). However, the amount varies. The draft № 13271 provides that: “if such information differs from the reliable data by an amount ranging from 1000 to 2000 subsistence minimums for individuals able to work (SMIAW)”; while draft laws  № 13271-1 and 13271-2 – from 750 to 2500 SMIAW (500 to 2000 under the current CC), and also increase the corresponding threshold in Article 172-6 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (CAO): 100-1000 SMIAW (according to the draft law 13271); 150-750 SMIAW (according to the draft laws 13271-1, 13271-2). Currently it is 100-500 SMIAW under the CAO;
• to increase fines under part 1 of Article 366-2 of the CC: drafts 13271-1 and 13271-2 provides for 4000-6000 non-taxable minimum incomes (NTMI), while  currently it is 4000-5000 NTMI under the CC; as well as under part 2 of Article 366-2 of CC: from 6,000 to 8,000 NTMI (currently it is 4000-5000 NTMI);
• to increase the threshold for unlawful enrichment (Article 2368-5 of CC) to 8,000 SMIAW (draft law 13271); to lower this threshold to 2750 SMIAW (draft laws 13271-1 and 13271-2), while the current CC provides a threshold of 6500. Additionally, to increase the minimum threshold for civil forfeiture to 750 SMIAW, whereas the current threshold under Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine is 500 SMIAW;
• all three draft laws propose to limit the retention period of personal data in the Unified State Register of individuals who have committed corruption or corruption-related offenses (Article 59 of the Law “On Corruption Prevention”). Draft laws 13271 and 13271-2 propose that the retention period vary depending on the type of liability imposed, while draft law 13271-1 limits the retention period, providing that it may not exceed that established by Article 39 of the CAO and Article 89 of the CC;
• in article 51-4 of the Law “On Corruption Prevention” to restrict the lifestyle monitoring conducted by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) solely to the period during which an individual held specific public positions; limit the duration of lifestyle monitoring to 4 months from the date the decision to initiate such monitoring is issued (according to the draft laws 13271-1 and 13271-2);
• to amend the jurisdiction of detectives of the Bureau of Economic Security of Ukraine (BES), established in Article 216 of the CPC (according to the draft law 13271); determine the jurisdiction of detectives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) based on the threshold amount of certain offenses (according to the draft law 13271-1), as well as the jurisdiction of both BES and NABU detectives (according to the draft law   13271-2); 

The explanatory notes to all three draft laws (13271, 13271-1, and 13271-2) rely on identical reasoning, referencing the ECtHR judgement in “Sytnyk v. Ukraine” (of April 24, 2025), yet without citing specific paragraphs of the ruling. In that case, the ECtHR found violations of Articles 6, 8, and 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights, including shortcomings in the investigation and judicial proceedings (Article 6), the imposition of a disproportionate penalty – namely, indefinite inclusion in the register of corrupt individuals; disclosure of unidentified investigation data prior to the judgment (Article 8); use of the proceedings to pursue a concealed political objective (Article 18).

According to paragraph 149 of the judgment “any allegations of corruption should be duly investigated… The prosecution of an individual must not serve as a means of political retaliation for professional activity. The authorities in the present case were not preventing corruption in the public service as asserted by the Government, but rather a personal attack on the applicant’s moral and professional integrity” (paragraph 158 of the judgement).

1. In this regard, we agree with the ECtHR’s that the indefinite inclusion in the register of “corrupt individuals” constitutes lifelong stigmatization, violates the principle of proportionality and requirements of Article 8 of the Convention, clearly needs to be revised. However, the proposed amendments to Article 59 of the Law “On Corruption Prevention”  differ significantly in their wording and require thorough justification. Furthermore, it is long overdue to revise Article 39 of the CAO to extend the period after which a person is deemed not to have been subjected to an administrative penalty, as well as Article 89 of the CC concerning the expiration of criminal records, particularly in cases of intentional offenses, for which this period should be no less than two years.

2. Importantly, the ECtHR’s judgment did not identify flaws in the substantive provisions of criminal or administrative legislation regarding the fight against corruption, nor did it criticize the CPC itself. Rather, the Court highlighted deficiencies in the investigation (enforcement) which is carried out contrary  to the legal provisions. Thus, the proposal to lower or modify the minimum threshold for knowingly submitting false information in declarations (Article 366-2 of the CC and Article 172-6 of the CAO) bears no direct relevance to the ECtHR ruling. Instead, it appears to be a concealed attempt to weaken existing anti-corruption safeguards.

3. Proposals of the draft laws 13271-1 and 13271-2 to lower the threshold for Illicit enrichment under Article 368-5 of the CC to 2750 subsistence minimums for individuals able to work (SMIAW) (compared to the current threshold of 6500) can not be supported. It would significantly narrow the scope for applying civil forfeiture under part 2 of Article 290 of the CPC. At the same time, the proposal of the draft law 13271 to increase this threshold to 8,000 SMIAW appears more balanced and can be accepted.

4. The proposal of the draft laws 13271-1 and 13271-2 to raise the minimum threshold for applying civil forfeiture to 750 SMIAW under Article 290 of the CPC would restrict its use. In fact, it is a matter of providing an unpunished opportunity for illegal enrichment of up to UAH 2 271 000.

5. Limiting lifestyle monitoring exclusively to the period during which an individual held a relevant public position would prevent the analysis of their prior lifestyle and may facilitate preparation for corruption (e.g., falsely declaring significant cash holdings as acquired before assuming office). Furthermore, limiting monitoring only to certain categories of officials listed in Article 3 of the Law “On corruption Prevention” appears unjustified.

There have been repeated attempts in the past to impose time limits on lifestyle monitoring. For example, draft law № 12374-d, introduced on May 10, 2025, proposed a three-month limit. In response, the NACP emphasized: “Monitoring requires sufficient time to analyze extensive data, submit international requests, and thoroughly review financial documents. Even a basic lifestyle monitoring may take six months, while complex cases can extend beyond a year. The proposed limits would make effective corruption detection impossible”. As of May 30, 2025, these proposals had been rejected. Supporting such initiatives without a detailed assessment of the actual time required for effective monitoring, taking into account all relevant circumstances, is unacceptable.

Overall, the draft laws appear to be driven less by the genuine implementation of the ECtHR ruling and more by an intent to weaken anti-corruption accountability, using the judgment largely as a convenient pretext.