Weekly analysis for 15 — 21 July

Law 4555 Contradicts Several International Treaties and National Laws at Once

Event

On July 22, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law № 4555 “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Peculiarities of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offenses Related to the Disappearance of Persons Under Special Circumstances During Martial Law”. The draft law was registered on January 16, 2025, under № 12414 and was passed by Parliament on July 22, 2025 (hereinafter – Law 4555).

As its title suggests, the law introduces certain amendments to both the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, including the following:

1. Weakened Role of the SAPO

The Head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) becomes a largely symbolic figure with authority now comparable to that of other Deputy Prosecutors General. The position is no longer recognized as the head of the prosecution office for SAPO prosecutors and  no longer exercises the prosecutorial leadership powers, as provided by the CPC, in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the NABU. He is no longer authorized to appoint a prosecutor as the procedural supervisor in a specific criminal case, to form prosecutorial teams, or to designate a lead prosecutor within such teams.

The SAPO Head, as well as his First Deputy and other Deputies, are now also deprived of the authority to supplement, amend, or withdraw an appeal or cassation complaint, or motions to review court decisions based on newly discovered or exceptional circumstances, even if such filings were made by themselves, SAPO unit heads, their deputies, or other SAPO prosecutors. Furthermore, they no longer have the authority to extend the pre-trial investigation period after a person has been notified of suspicion in a corruption-related criminal offense.

Moreover, the ability of SAPO prosecutors to enter into plea agreements with suspects or defendants in NABU-handled cases is also significantly restricted. In practice, such agreements will be nearly impossible without the consent of the Prosecutor General, should he or she choose to demand such approval.

2. Expanded Powers of the Prosecutor General

Law 4555 introduces substantial expansions to the powers of the Prosecutor General, including the following:

– new exclusive authority to issue notices of suspicion to high-ranking officials, including the Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and their deputies, the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet of Ministers, first deputies and deputies of ministers, the Director of the State Bureau of Investigation and their deputies, the Director of the Bureau of Economic Security and their deputies, as well as Category “A” civil servants;

– issue binding written instructions to the Head of the NABU compelling the transfer of pre-trial investigation materials. Upon gaining access to such materials, the Prosecutor General has the authority to assign another prosecutor to verify compliance with the law during the pre-trial investigation. This raises concerns about the confidentiality of pre-trial investigations;

– assign criminal investigations falling under NABU’s jurisdiction to another investigative body “in cases of ineffective pre-trial investigation or in case of objective circumstances unabling the functioning of the competent investigative body or its ability to conduct investigations during martial law”;

– designate as NABU cases criminal proceedings under Articles 369 and 369-2 of the CC (offering undue benefit to an official and abuse of influence), provided the alleged offenses were committed by top officials and caused or could have caused serious harm to the legally protected rights and interests of individuals or legal entities, as well as to public or state interests (including the exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms of three or more persons);

– resolve jurisdictional disputes in criminal proceedings that may fall within NABU’s investigative competence.

3. Amended personnel procedures in prosecutorial bodies

Law 4555 modifies the procedure for appointing prosecutors at all levels during the period of martial law. According to the new rules, virtually any local prosecutor or even an individual with no prior experience in the prosecution service, can now be appointed to the Office of the Prosecutor General without undergoing a competitive selection process. A current prosecutor needs only to submit a formal application, while a person with no prior prosecutorial background must provide the standard documents required for a prosecutorial candidate (such as an application, a medical certificate, a certificate of proficiency in the state language, a copy of a law degree diploma, etc.).

The revised Article 60 of the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office”, as amended by Law 4555, also introduces a new basis for dismissal: a prosecutor may be dismissed if they fail to consent to an appointment or transfer to a vacant or temporarily vacant position in another prosecutorial body within 30 days of being notified of available vacancies.

Decisions regarding dismissal on these grounds are made by the disciplinary body responsible for such proceedings. Notably, a prosecutor’s repeated failure to appear at a disciplinary hearing – regardless of the reason – does not prevent the case from being considered in his/her absence. In practice, this means, for example, that a regional prosecutor could be offered a substantially less favorable position, and refusal to accept such a transfer may result in dismissal.

4. Other changes

Law 4555 amends part three of Article 233 as follows: “an investigator, inquest officer, or prosecutor has the right to enter a person’s residence or other premises prior to a ruling by the investigative judge only in urgent cases involving the saving of human lives, preventing an immediate threat to health, sexual freedom, or personal safety, or when in the immediate pursuit of individuals suspected of committing crimes under Articles 112, 115–119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 135, 136, 146, 147, 149, 152–156-1, 258, 258-1, and 259 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, or in cases where there is an urgent need to seize or preserve evidence related to such crimes”. These provisions concern specific criminal offenses that threaten life and health, personal freedom, honor, dignity, sexual freedom and inviolability, as well as public safety (including terrorism).

CPLR’s assessment 

 According to the Constitution, Ukraine is a sovereign and independent, democratic, and social state governed by the rule of law, in which the principle of the rule of law is recognized and upheld.

One of the driving forces for the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the recognition that disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbaric acts which have outraged the conscience of humanity. In response, the Declaration affirmed the aspiration to build a world in which people enjoy freedom of speech and belief, and freedom from fear and want – a vision embraced as a common ideal by all nations.

Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that nothing in the Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group, or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided therein.

According to Article 6 of the UN Convention against Corruption, each State Party shall, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its legal system, ensure the necessary independence of the body or bodies responsible for preventing corruption, to enable them to carry out their functions effectively and free from any undue influence.

The effective operation of anti-corruption institutions was one of the preconditions for granting Ukraine candidate status for accession to the EU. Their performance is subject  to evaluation in a dedicated section of the EU Accession Roadmap, under the “Fundamentals” chapter, which addresses the rule of law. The importance of maintaining their independence is consistently reaffirmed in European Commission progress reports.

The Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021–2025 identifies as a key strategic outcome the implementation of clear and effective guarantees of institutional and operational independence for both the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

However, the amendments introduced by Law 4555 significantly undermine this objective. The Head of SAPO is stripped of key procedural powers, with the position’s role reduced primarily to representative and administrative functions. Procedural authority is effectively transferred to the Prosecutor General, while SAPO retains its status as a separate structural unit of the prosecution service in name only. All key levers of influence over anti-corruption investigations are now concentrated in the hands of the Prosecutor General – an official appointed by the Verkhovna Rada upon the President’s nomination, without a competitive selection, integrity vetting, or professional qualifications assessment.

The simplified procedures for appointing and dismissing prosecutors, including the ability to fabricate grounds for dismissal,  create opportunities for pressure and retaliation against prosecutors who perform their duties with integrity and good faith. While previously only the Prosecutor General was politically dependent, Law 4555 undermines the independence of the entire prosecutorial corps..

This shift represents a return to the “unity and centralization” approach that characterized the prosecution system prior to the 2014 reform, which was dissolved with the adoption of the new Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office”. Further, with the 2016 amendments to the Constitution, the prosecution was removed from the so-called fourth “oversight” branch of government and integrated into the justice system. With the enshrinement in the Constitution’s preamble of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic course, the operation of the prosecution must comply with European standards, including those applied to the judiciary, most importantly, the principle of independence (both external and internal). The amendments to the CPC introduced by Law 4555 effectively undermine these principles, putting them in direct contradiction with the Constitution of Ukraine and Ukraine’s commitments under its European integration agenda. 

Elimination of procedural independence for SAPO prosecutors, combined with the ability granted to other prosecutors authorized by the Prosecutor General to access criminal case materials, effectively undermines the core purpose of existence of specialized anti-corruption institutions. Furthermore, the Prosecutor General is empowered with broad discretion to declare any NABU investigation ineffective and to transfer the case to the SBI or the National Police. This shift will turn the fight against corruption into a tool for interagency confrontation, rendering it a fiction.

Regarding the expanded grounds for entering a person’s home or property without a court order, the amendments specify situations in which it is possible to override the guarantee of inviolability of one’s home if the crimes involved pose a particularly serious threat to public safety. On the other hand, Article 30 of the Constitution of Ukraine explicitly guarantees the inviolability of a person’s home or other property, allowing exceptions only in urgent situations involving the saving of life or property, or in the immediate pursuit of individuals suspected of committing a crime, as specifically defined by law. Therefore, Law 4555 unjustifiably expands the list of “urgent cases” allowing pretrial investigation officials to enter personal homes or other premises without an investigative judge’s order, directly contradicting the Constitution.

Thus, Law 4555 poses a serious threat to fundamental rights of citizens, particularly the right to protection from arbitrary interference in private life. It eliminates Ukraine’s progress in the fight against corruption, contradicts several fundamental international and national legal acts at once, undermines the foundations of democracy, creates additional opportunities for corruption offenders to evade responsibility, and casts serious doubt over Ukraine’s continued adherence to European  integration commitments and the Anti-Corruption Strategy.

Draft law on resuming competitions for civil service positions: it won’t be fast and quality is questionable thus far

Event

On July 15, a government draft law “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Resuming Competitions and Improvement of the Procedure for Entry, Service, and Termination in Civil Service” was registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billinfo/Bills/Card/56801)). Draft law was submitted under the signature of Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal (№ 13478) and its adoption in the third quarter of 2025 is identified as a key indicator for implementing the EU’s Ukraine Facility Plan.

CPLR’s assessment

Concerning the procedural detail arises it should be noted that according § 105 of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which stipulates that a draft law submitted by the Cabinet of Ministers is considered withdrawn if, prior to its adoption at first reading, the Cabinet’s powers are terminated (the government resigned on July 16). In such cases, the draft should be removed from parliamentary consideration, with a corresponding note entered into the unified automated system.

According to § 121 of the Government’s Rules of Procedure, if the draft law remains relevant, it must be reintroduced within one month following the appointment of a new Cabinet of Ministers (the new government was formed on July 17).

This raises concerns about the appropriateness of submitting the draft law just one day before the Cabinet’s resignation. There had been nearly five months to take this step, as public consultations on the draft initiated by its developer – the National Agency of Ukraine for Civil Service (NAUCS) were held back in February 2025. Notably, most proposals from the non-governmental sector were not taken into account (the report on this regard here).

Substantively, the draft Law introduces several positive aspects, which have been partly carried over from the previously withdrawn Government draft law № 6496, which was withdrawn for reasons that remain unclear (registered on December 31, 2021 and was under parliamentary consideration until  September 3, 2024).

Among the positive provisions in the draft law are: introduction of a reserve list for candidates who have passed competirion and may be appointed to relevant positions within a year; opportunities for internal career advancement for civil servants; preferential appointment rights for veterans and youth, provided candidates possess equal professional competence; and several other provisions. At the same time, the draft Law contains a number of significant shortcomings:

1) excessively prolonged timelines for resumption of competitions, including:  for Category “A” civil service positions – from June 1, 2026, with a maximum 12-month period for announcing competitions; Category “B” positions: from 1 July 2026, also with a 12-month announcement period; for Category “C” civil service positions and positions in local self-government bodies – from September 1, 2026, with a maximum 18-month deadline for announcing competitions;

2) persistent politicization of the Commission on the Higher Civil Service Corps, with a majority of members (4 out of 7) defined by the Verkhovna Rada, the President, and the Cabinet of Ministers.

3) unequal conditions for other citizens, as well as significant discretion granted to leaders, allowing them to extend the service of individuals whom they appointed without competitive procedures during martial law.

4) lack of provisions aimed at restoring continuity in civil service careers , and lack of safeguards against arbitrary dismissals.

It is worth noting that, as of today, the draft Law dated July 15, 2025 (№ 13478) has been withdrawn by the Government. However, an alternative draft law № 13478-1 submitted on 16 July 2025 by MPs O. Korniienko and V. Bezgyn, remains under consideration. This alternative version is identical to the originally proposed with one exception: it proposes reducing the required experience for membership in the Commission on Higher Civil Service Corps (from 10 years to 5 years).

At the same time, according to the rule set out in § 110 of the Rules of Procedure, the Verkhovna Rada considers alternative draft laws simultaneously with the main draft law. Therefore, the main draft law submitted in accordance with the established procedure will still have to be resubmitted and considered under this rule.

If the new Government chooses to submit a new draft law, it would be advisable to amend the existing provisions and introduce new ones that better reflect the public expectations. At a minimum, this should involve setting more realistic timelines for the resumption of competitive selection processes and the termination of dismissals based on formal grounds – issues previously emphasized by the European Commission in its assessment report.

Otherwise, these significant shortcomings can only be effectively addressed during the preparation of the draft law for its second reading provided that the process is transparent and open to non-governmental organizations. This approach would help avoid a repeat of the so-called “turbo mode” tactic, which focuses solely on formally meeting indicators of the Ukraine Facility Plan. Such a scenario occurred with the draft law on unified remuneration approaches (№ 8222), which ultimately contained numerous exemptions for various state agencies.

NABU’s and SAP’s Independence Is Being Restored, But…

Event

Following the enactment of Law № 4555 “On Amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine Regarding the Peculiarities of Pre-Trial Investigation of Criminal Offenses Related to the Disappearance of Persons Under Special Circumstances During Martial Law”, which significantly weakened the independence of specialized anti-corruption institutions and expanded the powers of the Prosecutor General, thousands of people across Ukraine took to the streets, demanding the restoration of NABU’s and SAP’s independence.

On July 24, three draft laws were submitted by the Members of Parliament and the President, namely №№ 13531, 13531-1, and 13533, aimed at restoring the status quo of the NBU and SAP.

CPLR’s assessment

The draft laws, submitted by the MPs (reg. № 13531 and 13531-1), are nearly identical in content, both aiming to revert the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) and the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” to their previous versions that were in effect before the Law № 4555 was adopted. The only difference is that law No. 13531-1 introduces a requirement for the NABU employees to undergo evaluation in accordance with procedures set by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. A refusal or failure to undergo such an evaluation would result in an employee’s dismissal. The rationale and purpose of introducing this ad hoc procedure remain unclear, especially given that NABU already has an Internal Control Department authorized to conduct internal investigations, monitor employees’ lifestyles, and examine any circumstances relating to violations of standards and principles of ethical conduct.

The presidential draft law № 13533, while formally restoring the independence of NABU and SAP, retains expanded powers for the Prosecutor General. These include the authority to issue binding written instructions to the head of any pre-trial investigation body in order to obtain access to materials of criminal cases, including those held by the Bureau of Economic Security (BES). Investigator. The investigative body’s failure to comply with such an instruction may serve as grounds for transferring the case to another agency. However, this provision does not apply to NABU. This provision introduces (or rather, effectively reinstates from the post-soviet era) the Prosecutor General’s supervisory authority over all criminal proceedings, strengthening centralization within the prosecutorial system.

The President also proposes that jurisdictional disputes in criminal proceedings that may fall under the authority of the BES be resolved by the Prosecutor General (or the acting official). This provision could be somewhat balanced if an independent head of the BES were appointed.

Additionally, if draft law № 13533 is adopted, the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” could retain simplified procedures for appointing prosecutors during martial law, along with a provision allowing for the dismissal of a prosecutor who fails to consent within 30 days of notification to be appointed to a vacant or temporarily vacant position, or to be transferred to such a position in another prosecutorial body. We have previously highlighted the shortcomings of these provisions: they create conditions that favor the appointment of less qualified but more politically loyal prosecutors, and they leave room for potential corruption.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that these provisions will have negative impact on both the prosecution system as a whole and the SAP, as the simplified appointment procedures (bypassing experience requirements and competitive selection) and the grounds for dismissal, which effectively serve as a tool of pressure on prosecutors, would also apply to the anti-corruption unit.

As previously noted, the cumulative amendments to the Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” introduced by Law №  4555 have effectively entrenched manual control over the prosecution system, weakened prosecutorial independence, and partially undermined the achievements of the prosecutorial reform.

The presidential draft law also includes provisions proposing polygraph examinations for employees of NABU, SAP, BES, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the State Bureau of Investigation, and the National Police who have access to state secrets, aimed at identifying potential ties to the aggressor state. However, this procedure has several flaw. Notably, polygraphs lack scientific reliability and may violate the right to respect for human dignity, which prohibits the conduct of medical, scientific, or any other forms of experiments on an individual without his/her free consent (Part 3, Article 28 of the Constitution of Ukraine).

The President’s proposal to prohibit all NABU employees from traveling abroad except for official business trips also looks dubious. Currently, such restriction applies only to employees reserved for the mobilization and martial law period by government authorities. Expanding this limitation could create additional control over the anti-corruption agency’s staff, hinder their ability to engage in activities within the international legal assistance, and infringe on their rights, such as seeking necessary medical treatment abroad.

Draft laws №№ 13531, 13531-1, and 13533 propose removing from the CPC an additional ground for unauthorized searches. This provision contradicted the Constitution and allowed prosecutors, investigators, and detectives to seize evidence from premises without a court warrant. However, this provision, both in its original version and as proposed by the draft laws, needs further refinement. The Constitution provides that the inviolability of the home can only be breached without a court warrant in urgent cases involving the protection of life or property, or the immediate pursuit of persons suspected of committing a crime. Currently, instead of the term “crime,” the CPC uses a broader term “criminal offense,” which also includes criminal infractions (least serious criminal offenses).

Thus, all three draft laws would undoubtedly support the restoration of the NABU’s and the SAP’s independence. However, draft laws 13531-1 and 13533 require further refinement. This is particularly the case for draft law 13533, which contains provisions that could be used as tools of pressure on other pre-trial investigation bodies and prosecutors. Given these concerns, it is clear that these drafts will receive comments and objections, making it procedurally impossible to adopt them in a single day both as a basis and in full (Part 4 of Article 102 and Part 2 of Article 114 of the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine). Therefore, draft law 13531 should receive preference.