Weekly analysis for 05 — 11 August

Symbolic struggle for the Soviet model of the prosecution is still ongoing

Event

On August 6, 2025, a group of MPs (Nekliudov V. M., Pavliuk M. V., Ionushas S. K., and Zakharchenko V. V.) submitted Draft Law № 13603 “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On the Prosecutor’s Office” Regarding Improving the Efficiency of the Prosecutor’s Office” to the Verkhovna Rada. In reality, the substance of the draft law has little to do with efficiency. It aims to reinstate class ranks of prosecutors, renamed as “state ranks”. In particular, the draft law proposes to:

– introducing state ranks for prosecutors as a form of special ranks, to be awarded upon appointment or after completion of probation, with rank promotions based on length of service, position, and professional performance;

– granting authority to the President of Ukraine to award the ranks of State Counselor of Justice, Class 1, 2, and 3, with all other ranks conferred by the Prosecutor General;

– making ranks permanent, subject to possible demotion or revocation as a disciplinary measure;

– introducing official insignia corresponding to prosecutors’ state ranks.

Background

The Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office” of October 14, 2014, launched a reform aimed at aligning Ukraine’s prosecution service with democratic standards. Responding to criticism from the Venice Commission, the 2014 law for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine removed the principle of “single authority” and centralization, a hallmark of the Soviet-style prosecution system. It also established a unified legal status for all prosecutors in Ukraine and abolished class ranks along with their insignia and related distinctions on prosecutors’ uniforms, although those already holding ranks continued to receive the associated payments. Law № 113-IX  of September 19, 2019, completed this process by fully abolishing (“resetting”) class ranks for all prosecutors and eliminating the prosecutorial uniform.

Despite these reforms, each of the last three Prosecutors General began their tenure by submitting draft laws to Parliament seeking to reinstate class ranks (draft laws №3062 of February 13, 2020; № 9452 of July 3, 2023). All three draft laws (3062, 9452, 13603) are  nearly identical, differing only in minor details. Their explanatory notes also repeat the same rationale: to create effective incentives for young staff, raise prosecutors’ professional qualifications, ensure higher quality and productivity, improve accountability, encourage career advancement, and eliminate the “discriminated” position of prosecutors compared to  civil servants and police officers who hold special ranks, as well as military personnel who hold military ranks.

CPLR’s assessment

Social and ethical aspects. Class ranks, state ranks, grades, and similar titles share the same purpose, legal nature, and substance: they reflect an internal system of advancement, hierarchy, and subordination; define relations of seniority and subordination beyond subordination by position; and allow those with higher ranks to give instructions, advice, or recommendations to juniors, which are generally expected to be followed. Such hierarchical systems inevitably create an ethical environment of cooperation based on rank deference.

Constitutional aspect. According to the Constitution of Ukraine, the prosecutor’s office and the bar belong to the area of justice. For the functions of prosecution, defense, and justice to be performed effectively, all three legal professions in this area rely equally on independence, “judicial dignity,” freedom of judgment, and personal maturity  –  acting without undue regard for the views of older or more experienced colleagues, and instead relying on one’s own knowledge, objective evaluation of evidence, inner conviction, and the capacity to make and substantiate procedural decisions independently. The mere existence of state ranks would, at a subconscious level, encourage a culture of rank deference, reinforcing the cyclical principle that “people create the system, and the system shapes the person”. Therefore, draft law № 13603 contradicts the constitutional nature of the prosecutor’s office as a part of the justice system.

Discriminatory aspect. The argument that prosecutors suffer career discrimination because they cannot advance in state rank, unlike other public service employees, is unfounded. Such reasoning reflects a misunderstanding of the nature, purpose, and principles of prosecutorial work. It is worth recalling that during the Soviet era and until 2010, Ukrainian judges were also assigned qualification classes, yet the judicial community abandoned this practice without any lingering sense of loss.

International aspect. Draft Law № 13603 is inconsistent with Ukraine’s commitments to the Council of Europe concerning reform of the prosecution service in accordance with European standards, given the functions a prosecutor’s office should perform in a democratic society. The system of prosecutors’ class ranks was deliberately and systematically abolished; reinstating it under the rebranded name of “state ranks” represents a reversal rather than consistent reform policy.

Procedural aspect. The proposed insignia for prosecutors’ state ranks contradict the principles of procedural equality, the adversarial nature of proceedings, and the free evaluation of evidence. They risk diverting the court’s attention away from the substantive reasoning and merits of prosecutorial arguments toward an external factor — the prosecutor’s status (regalia).

Incentive aspect. There is no genuine relation between the state ranks for prosecutors and their associated insignia and the fostering of high-quality prosecutorial performance, which would have no positive impact on professional outcomes indicators.

We hope that, following the “rule of three” from folk tradition, Draft Law №13603 will fail and mark the final effort in modern Ukrainian history by legislative actors to reverse reforms and reinstate the cultural symbols (special ranks) and material artifacts (rank insignia) of the Soviet-era prosecution system along with its outdated stereotypes and notions of incentives and rewards for prosecutors’ career advancement.

Exposing Corruption by Military Personnel: Not All Problems Have Been Eradicated Yet

Event

On August 7, a draft law titled “On Amendments to the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to Ensure Guarantees of Protection and Rights of Military Personnel Reporting Possible Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses, and Other Violations of the Law of Ukraine “On Corruption Prevention”” (№ 13605) (hereinafter — the Draft Law) was registered in the Verkhovna Rada. The Draft Law proposes the following amendments to the Disciplinary Statute of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter — the Statute):

– emphasize the right of military personnel to report corruption or corruption-related offenses discovered in connection with their service, while extending protections to military whistleblowers; 

– provide for incentives for whistleblowers within the military personnel in accordance with the Statute; 

– clarify the right of all military personnel to submit statements, complaints, or reports, or personally address officials, military command authorities, the Military Law Enforcement Service, authorized  anti-corruption units (officials), pre-trial investigation authorities, other state bodies, and the National Agency on Corruption Prevention when “detecting possible facts of corruption or corruption-related offenses, or other violations of the Law of Ukraine “On Corruption Prevention”;

– establish that whistleblowers among military personnel may independently choose which channels to use to report possible facts of corruption or related offenses  – internal, regular, or external;

– specify that the requirements for whistleblower reports by military personnel, procedures and deadlines for their consideration, rights of military personnel during review, and responsibilities of immediate commanders (supervisors), other involved parties, military command authorities, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in handling these reports shall be governed by the Law of Ukraine “On Corruption Prevention.”

CPLR’s assessment

It is important to support the concerns raised by the Main Scientific and Expert Department of the Verkhovna Rada’s Office regarding Draft Law № 12040, where noted that the proposed Article 87-1 of the Statute limits the concept of a whistleblower among military personnel to matters known to the individual solely in connection with military service. This restriction means that if a serviceman reports possible corruption offenses or other violations discovered outside the context of his/her military duties, the legal protections afforded to whistleblowers would not apply.

A similar draft law was previously registered in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (№ 12040 of September 17, 2024), but was withdrawn in accordance with paragraph 1 § 121 of the Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine due to the termination of the previous Cabinet’s powers (pursuant to Verkhovna Rada resolution № 4550 ofJuly 17, 2025).

Similar limiting provisions remain in Draft Law № 13605. They fail to meet the requirements of the Law of Ukraine “On Corruption Prevention” regarding the protection of all whistleblowers, regardless of the circumstances under which they became aware of corruption offenses or related violations.

Furthermore, a separate draft law should be introduced to establish, in line with part 6 of Article 3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (hereinafter — the CC), criminal liability within Chapter XIX of the CC for violations of the rights of military whistleblowers. This would be similar to Article 172 of the current CC, which provides liability for violations of the rights of whistleblower employees. This is necessary since under Ukrainian law, a serviceman is not classified as an employee.

Discrimination: Not a Crime?

Event

On August 4, a group of Members of Parliament initiated amendments to both the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses and the Criminal Code of Ukraine aimed at fighting against discrimination (draft law № 13597, hereinafter — the draft law).  Among key provisions of the draft law are the following:

– defining the terms “intolerance” and “discrimination” (in line with Article 1 of the Law “On Principles of Preventing and Countering Discrimination in Ukraine”) specifically for application in terms of articles 67, 115, 121, 122, 126, 127, 129, 161, and 300 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CC), as well as Article 188-58 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses;

– revising Article 161 of the CC by introducing responsibility for public calls to violence motivated by intolerance.

CPLR’s assessment

Article 8 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC, which enshrines the principle of equal treatment regardless of racial or ethnic origin, provides that EU Member States shall take effective measures enabling courts or other competent authorities to establish facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination when a person consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.

At the same time, Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and the Council, adopted on April 28, 2021, which establishes the “Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values” Programme and repeals Regulations (EU) №1381/2013 and №390/2014, provides a definition of “intolerance” as one that support actions to prevent and combat all forms of discrimination, racism, xenophobia, afrophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Gypsyism, anti-Muslim hatred, and allforms of intolerance, including homophobia, biphobia, transphobia, interphobia, and intolerance based on gender identity, both online and offline, as well as intolerance of persons belonging to minorities. 

In light of these frameworks, certain amendments to Article 161 and other provisions of the CCU are essential to clarify and unify the relevant concepts.

At the same time, the draft law not only openly violates the provisions of Part 6 of Article 3 of the CCU and Part 4 of Article 2 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offenses but also contains substantive flaws that may complicate the practical application of the CCU.

1. Part 1 of Article 161 of the CCU should explicitly establish responsibility for the dissemination or use of materials containing calls for violence motivated by intolerance or hatred, as such socially dangerous conduct falls outside the current definition of “public calls”.

2. It is doubtful whether public calls alone may cause severe consequences. Rather than defining the existence of serious consequences as an aggravating circumstance in Part 3 of Article 161 of the CCU, it would be more appropriate to treat public calls made via the media or under conditions of disaster, accident, natural calamity, mass unrest, armed conflict, or other emergencies as especially aggravating circumstances.

3. In the proposed version of Article 300 of the CCU, the terms “propaganda of violence, cruelty…” (Part 1) and “works promoting the cult of violence and cruelty…” (Parts 2 and 3) are used inconsistently. Clearly, Part 1 should also refer to the cult of violence and cruelty, etc. – a phenomenon where violence and cruelty are treated as central values that are venerated.

4. In Article 300 of the CCU and in cl. 2 and 8 of Part 1 of Article 1 of the Law “On the Principles of Preventing and Countering Discrimination in Ukraine”, coordinating conjunctions “and” (“as well as”) are mistakenly used in place of disjunctive conjunctions “or.” Consequently, according to the principle of legal certainty, this implies that a person can be held criminally liable only if he/she, for example, both distributes the relevant materials and simultaneously coerces others to commit such acts, or if the materials simultaneously promote the cult of violence, the cult of cruelty, intolerance, and discrimination, or if negative treatment occurs based on both family and social origin simultaneously, and so forth. Therefore, to avoid such restrictive interpretations, the words “and” and “as well as” should be replaced with “or” in these contexts.

5. Part 1 of Article 300 of the CCU is also unclear regarding the specific actions to which coercion applies – whether it refers to coercion to import into Ukraine, manufacture, distribute, or sell materials, or coercion to propagate them.

6. Finally, the proposed attempt to decriminalize restrictions or violations of a human or citizen’s rights, or the unlawful granting of privileges to a person motivated by intolerance, is highly questionable. Such an approach contradicts, at least, Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Furthermore, it conflicts with Article 22 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits narrowing the content or scope of existing rights and freedoms when adopting new laws or amending existing ones. Removing discrimination from the list of criminal offenses affects the scope of the human right to equality.

Additionally, Article 16 of the Law “On the Principles of Preventing and Countering Discrimination in Ukraine” explicitly states that individuals found guilty of violating anti-discrimination laws bear criminal responsibility.